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ABSTRACT
The paper studies a two-region economy , with two sectors and
three factors of production : oil, capital and labor . The South
exports oil in exchange for industrial goods from the North .
There is a net capital inflow to the South . This equals the
difference between its export revenues and import costs, and
represents the South's indebtedness . This overseas borrowing
finances the development of the oil sector : increased borrowing
leads to higher oil supplies, to new levels of consumption and
a new distribution of income in the South, as well as to new levels
of exports from the North . The paper studies the macro impacts of
changes in the value of the debt on both the borrowing and the
lending regions . The results are illustrated by simulations with
data for the U .S .A . and Mexico .
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RESOURCES , TRADE AND DEBT :
The case of Mexico
1 . INTRODUCTION
A great deal of attention has been given recently to the debt problems of
developing countries, most notably Argentina, Brazil . Ecuador, and Mexico .
Their debts currently total about 300 billion US dollars, of which kexico's share
is about one third. Ecuador and Mexico are particularly interesting cases
because their current difficulties follow a period of concentration on oil
exports, an activity which was widely recommended, and which it was generally
thought would improve rather than worsen their balance-of-payments condi-
tions.
Experience has not fulfilled these expectations It is now clear that the
relationship between resource export policies and debt is rather complex, and
poses a challenge to the economist . In the case of Mexico . it is generally
accepted that much of the borrowing was used to finance the development of
its oil export sector . Sterner (1982) shows that about 309. of Mexico's out-
standing debt was used to finance investment in PEYEX. the national oil com-
pany . It appears therefore that there exists a link between borrowing and oil
exports, and the macroeconomic impacts of borrowing and of resource exports
must be jointly analyzed and balanced against each other. It is the purpose of
this paper to explore these links .
Afirst concern is the impact of increasing oil exports on the exporting
country .
This was studied in Chichilnisky (1981a) w thin a two-region
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country by developing overseas supplies of food and raw material, thus mating
these supplies more elastic, keeping down prices, and improving the UK's
terms of trade . Essentially we are specifying here conditions for overseas
investment in material supplies to benefit the investing country even before
any financial returns are paid . or in the case of a loan, before the loan is
repaid.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows . To provide some empirical
background, we begin by reviewing the case of Mexico . We then present the
North-South model with debt. after which we prove the main theorems. The
conclusions summarize the results, and an appendix shows that. although the
model contains 33 independent equations, its comparative static properties
can be understood by studying a single implicit functional relationship between
one endogenous variable (the terms of trade of oil for industrial goods) and one
exogenous parameter (the value of the debt) .
2. EIdPIRICAL BACKGROUND: THE CASE OF MEXICO
In this section we review briefly the empirical material relating to a
number of the issues to be discussed below . The focus is on the case of Mexico,
which is an important exemplar of the phenomena under examination .
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FIGURE i The relationship between Mexico's cumulative balance-of-payments deficit
and investment in PEMEX, 1966-1981 . (All figureq are in billions of 1970 US dollars .)
In the Introduction we mentioned that the accumulation of Mexican debt is
generally believed to have been associated with investment in PEMEX Figure 1
presents data on this association . Mexico's cumulative balance-of-payments
deficit on current account is measured horizontally . The vertical axis
represents cumulative investment in PEMEX All figures are in billions of 197®
US dollars . and data sources are given after the tables below. It is clear from.;
Figure 1 that there is an almost one-to-one association between the cumulative
payments deficit and investments in PEMEX on average. the cumulative defi-
cit slightly exceeds investment in PEMEX but the two move very closely
indeed . This is confirmed by the regression in Table 1 . It therefore seems jus-
tifiable to claim that investment in PEMEX was financed by the payments defi-
cit, and indeed this provides the empirical justification for an important
assumption in the model that follows .
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nGURE 2 The relationship between Mexico's outstanding overseas debt and her cumu-
lative payments deficit, 1965-1961. (All figures are in billions of 1970 US dollars .)
What is the relationship between Mexico's cumulative current account pay-
mentsdeficit, and her outstanding foreign debt? Figure 2 addresses this issue .
Except for the period 1976-1979, these variables moved together . with the
debt consistently some US32-3 billion in excess of the cumulative deficit . (Fig-
ures are again in billions of 1970 US dollars .) This interpretation of the graph is
supported by the regression in Table 2. and is consistent with the fact that
there was substantial private overseas borrowing by Mexican citizens which was
then used for the acquisition of overseas assets and which added to the accu-
mulation of overseas debt . In the model which follows : this borrowing to
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FIGURE 3 Mexicar imports, exports, and terms of trade, 1960-1982. (Exports and im-
ports are in billions of 197C US dollars.)
acquire overseas assets is neglected : it is assumed that indebtedness is equal
to the cumulative balance-of-payments deficit, and is used entirely to finance
investment in the oil sector . Obviously, this is a good approximation to the
data for Mexico . furthermore, it seems likely that borrowing to finance the
private acquisition of overseas assets had little macroeconomic impact within
Mexico . The important macroeconomic changes were driven by investment in
the oil sector . and by the consequent changes in oil output and oil exports . In
any case, we shall argue below that when the overseas investment by Mexicans
is taken into account, the results are likely to be reinforced .
Figure I reveals that Mexico's cumulative balance of payments deficit has risen
over time. Figure 3 shows the movement in imports, exports and terms of trade which
gave rise to this deficit . Exports rose steadily over the period, expecially after
Mexico became a net oil exporter in 1976 . Due to the 1979 oil shortage, Mexico's terms
of trade improved dramatically in 1980, reaching their peak in 1981 . In 1982 oil
exports again expanded rapidly, increasing nearly fifty percent over 1981, but late in
the year oil prices began to soften . By August of 1983 the average price of Mexican
crude oil exports had fallen about 20% (Mayan crude fell from $28 .50 in 1981 to $23 .00,
while the lighter 'Ishtmas' crude fell from $35.00 to $29.00 per barrel) . Having
borrowed heavily to develop its petroleum resources, the terms of trade began to shift
against Mexico just as it entered world markets as a major exporter. The downturn in
oil prices contributed to a dramatic devaluation and the large contraction of imports
shown in Figure 3 . The theoretical model of the next section explores the conditions
Data Sources:
TAf11X 1 OI .S regression of inwstment in PEMEX. PMXI> of they cumulative current-
aaount deficit, CG .
PMX1 =
	
0.598 + 0.844CCA
(1 .96) (19.36)
t -statistics in parentheses. Rz = 0.964.
TABLE 2 OLS regression of cumulative current account deficit. CCA, on outstanding over-
seas debt, D.
CCA = -1 .46 + 0.753D
(-2.03) (10.76)
t-statistics in parentheses. R2 = 0.665 .
All regressions cover the period 1965-1981.
PMXI Statistics on the Mexican Economy, NAFINSA. 198: .
CCA World Tables, 1981, World Bank .
D 1965-1972 International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1982.
1972-1981 Francisco Carrada-Bravo, 'The Dynamics of Foreign Debt
and Energy Policy : The Case of Mexico ." idimeo, Department of
Economics. University of California at Los Angeles.
IMP World Tables, 1981, World Bank.
TT World Tables, 1981, World Bank .
9. THENORM-SOUTH MODEL WITH DEBT
In this section we present the model, which is an extension of that of Chi-
chilnisky (1981a) . There are two regions, the North and the South. Each pro-
duces two goods, denoted B and 1, with three factors of production, capital K.
labor L . and oil d . The South exports an input, oil, in exchange for a good. the
"industrial" good 1 . The "basic" good B is not traded internationally.
We first specify the model for one region, namely the South. In what fol-
lows. the subscripts S and D will be used to denote supply and demand, and
the superscripts N and S to denote variables or parameters referring to the
North and South. respectively . All variables or parameters without a super-
script refer to the South . The superscripts B and I after a factor (e.g . LB . KI)
where r is the rate of profit . pl and pe will stand for the prices of industrial
goods and of oil, respectively The demand for B derives from wage income
PB BD = mL
The South produces oil (within given bounds), without using either domestic
capital or labor We shall assume that it uses the overseas borrowing or finan-
cial transfer FT to increase its oil supplies
0S = 73S (FT). C10S / 8FT > 0 (5)
This completes the behavioral specification for the South.
The equilibrium conditions for the South are :
BS = BD (7)
where B is not traded internationally .
ID = IS + MS (8)
where MS denotes the South's imports of I,
'd = Z3D + XISO (9)
denote the amount of that factor used in sector B or 1, respectively . .
The basic good is produced according to the relation
BS = min ~LB / a v 68 / b, . KB / c l j (1)
and the industrial good according to
IS =min II_ I /a2,16
1 /b2,K1 /c2) (2)
Labor and capital supplies are responsive to their rewards .
LS = awIPB , a>0 (3)
where uj is the wage and pB the price of B . and
ICS = Pr . 16 > 0 (4)
PBBD `PIID = WL + rK + POO + FT
Note that FT could be either positive or negative, depending on the relative
magnitudes of the debt service and the financial credit . However, as will be
seen below, the effect of a transfer (FT positive) is not symmetric with that of
a repayment (F7 negative), because of the irreversibility of the investment in
the oil sector . We assume that the entire financial transfer FT is used to pur-
chase industrial goods to augment the supply of oil . This means that the new
industrial investment in the oil sector is paid for by foreign loans . Hence, oil
supplies Os change as the debt level changes. the debt is assumed to increase
with increases in the level of the transfer (,FT positive), but obviously, it does
not decrease when FT is negative, since the debt is not paid by selling the oil
production equipment. The balance-of-payments condition (15) is that imports
of industrial goods exceed export revenues by FT . As the demand for the basic
good B comes entirely from wage income (eqn . 5) . the national income identity
((16) below) implies that the demand for industrial goods comes from the pro-
fit income rK, oil revenues p dX1 . and the borrowing FT. with the last of these
going to the oil sector . In the North we make a corresponding assumption.
namely that the financial transfer to the South is taken from income that
would otherwise have purchased industrial goods, so that the North's demand
for industrial goods is rK-FT.
In an equilibrium situation, Walras' Law or the national income identity of
the South is always satisfied (see e.g . Chichilnisky 1981x), i.e .
(16)
where d = Os is, as in (6) . a function of FT. Equation (16) can also be rewritten
as
PBBs - Pi (Is + BI) = wL + rK + Po(13D + Xe) + NF
	
(i6)°
The model of the North consists of the same 15 equations, but with possi-
bly different parameters a. Q . al, a2, b 1 . b2, c 1 , c2 . The following equation now
substitutes for the original eqn. (6) :
and . of course, the equations corresponding to (8) and (9) reflect the fact that
the North imports oil and exports industrial goods . In a world trade equili-
brium the prices of the traded goods must be equal:
Pe = Pa (17)
P1 = Pr (18)
where XS denotes oil exports by the South,
KS = KD (10)
Ls = LD (11)
LD = Bsa 1 + ISa2 (12)
KD _ BSc , + ISc2 (19)
13D = BS6 I + ISba (14)
and the payments condition
P"Xo = Pimp-FT (15)
and traded quantities must also match:
XV = 11a
	
(19)
Xf = B? (20)
where Xr and Xf represent. respectively, the North's exports of I and imports
of oil . There are therefore two sets of eight exogenous parameters each, one
set for the North and the other for the South. Each set contains
a, Q, 9 1 . a2. b
.
1 . b 2. c l , and C2. These parameters are generally different is the
two regions. We shall make certain stylized assumptions to simplify computa-
tions : a is large in the South and relatively smaller in the North, indicating that
labor is more "abundant" in the South. The corresponding parameter for capi-
tal exhibits the opposite behavior: P is larger in the North than in the South.
We shall also assume that c 1 is small in the South i.e . the production of basic
goods uses little capital . and a2 is small in the North. i.e . Northern industry
uses little labor. There are a total of 33 independent equations for the com-
plete North-South system : thirty correspond to two sets of (1) through (15).
one set for each region, and three equations arise from the international trade
conditions (1T) through (20), since of these four . as usual, only three are
linearly independent . There are 17 endogenously determined variables each in
the North and in the South: p1-P ,# , PB- ti, r, Ls . LD . KS . KD . BS . BD . IS ,
ID- M?-'OS , 'OD . and XS. Finally, we have the transfer FT, making a total of 35
endogenous variables for the complete North-South system. We therefore have
33 equations in 35 unknowns . When we choose the aurneraire (p,#'= 1) an
equilibrium is determined up to one variable . If we fix exogenously one vari-
able, the equilibrium is (locally) unique . We choose this variable to be the value
of the transfer FT. The transfer or loan thus becomes a policy variable . In the
Appendix we show how to compute explicitly a solution to the model, i.e . a
value for each of the endogenous variables . for each policy sector FT. In par-
ticular, we show that by successive substitutions the more important proper-
ties of the model can be obtained from the study of a single equation, giving an
implicit relationship between the financial transfer FT and the price of indus-
trial goods relative to oil .
There are a number of determinants whose signs are important in the fol-
lowing sections, which determine factor intensities in the different sectors . In
total we have the following technical input-output coefficients :
a 1 b 1 c 1
a2 b2 c2
in each t'egion . The determinants to be used are :
D = aIc2 _a2c1 N = clb2 _bIc2 Q = a2b1-a1b2
The assumptions are :
DN > 0. DS > 0 . NS < 0, QM < 0
The positivity of the determinant D implies that the basic goods sector is rela-
tively more labor intensive and the industrial goods sector relatively more cap-
ital intensive . The assumption (made above) that the basic goods sector uses
very little capital in the South implies that cs is small and therefore that
XS < 0 . The industrial goods sector in the North was assumed to use little
labor : hence a2 is small and Q1v < 0. The above assumptions on the signs of
-In-
the various determinants are maintained at all points below unless there is an
explicit statement to the contrary .
4 . LAIN RESULTS: TRADE AND DEBT
This section studies the impact of a change in the net transfer FT on the
economies of the North and the South. Before going on to the algebra, it seems
useful to explain the economics of this impact.
An increase in the transfer FT increases oil supplies %3S . since the South
invests borrowed funds in expanding the oil sector. At the new equilibrium .
corresponding to higher FT, the total amount of oil utilized in the North and in
the South therefore increases . This in turn alters the supplies of both goods in
each region, possibly in different proportions . The composition of the product
changes in both regions .
The changes in supplies lead to new equilibrium prices for the two goods .
The prices of the factors labor and capital also change as relatively more or
less labor and capital are employed . This implies that total income in the
North and in the South are different at the new equilibrium . The results in this
section give simple sufficient conditions for determining the signs of each of
these effects .
The first theorem gives conditions under which an increase in oil supplies
decreases the price of oil with respect to that of the industrial good. While it is
intuitively plausible that the price of oil should drop as supplies increase, this
is not always true . The second theorem gives conditions under which the rela-
tive price of oil increases as the transfer increases oil supplies . Whether one
or the other result obtains, depends on the relative strength of supply and
demand effects, and the general equilibrium solutions trace this in detail . The
results are obtained from various assumptions on technologies and initial
prices .
The next step is to explore the general equilibrium impacts of an increase
in the relative price of industrial goods . The rate of profit rises both in the
North and in the South . In the North. the rate of profit and the real wage move
together, because the North's economy is rather homogeneous . Therefore,
both wage and profit income increase in the North . and we show that there is
also an increase in the consumption of both goods, even allowing for the loss of
national income due to the transfer . All this occurs because the transfer has
improved significantly the North's terms of trade .
In the South . because of the rather different technologies in the two sec-
tors, the real wage moves in the opposite direction to the rate of profit . The
transfer increases oil supplies and oil exports, but oil revenues in terms of
industrial,,goods imported are reduced. Wage income and domestic consump-
tion of basics decrease as well . If one sought to improve wage income without
negatively affecting industrial consumption in the South, the economy of the
South would have to be made more homogeneous .
The second theorem explores a different set of assumptions, and arrives at
rather different conclusions . Now the transfer increases oil supplies, but it
also increases the relative price of oil with respect to industrial goods
	
As the
terms of trade of the South improve, its macro variables react differently, and
so do the variables in the North . The conditions under which one or the other
result obtains are therefore quite relevant for policy, and should be deter-
mined empirically . The simulations in the next section are a first move in this
direction .
A factor that plays an important role in determining the results of an
increase in the transfer FT is the sign of the expression
A= (c 2/D-2w/ps
) a
where D is the determinant of the matrix
The role and interpretation of this term have been discussed elsewhere (Chi-
chilnisky 1981a.b) . Basically, the sign of this expression determines whether
income effects will dominate price effects, so that increases in supplies will be
proportionately larger or smaller than increases in demand as prices change .
We refer to an economy as dual if c2/ D < 2w /pg , since a large D would have
this interpretation . Conversely, the economy is homogeneous if
c 2/ D > 2w /pq . It should be noted that this condition can be written so as to
be independent of the particular units of measurement used .
Theorem 1 . Consider a North-South economy as defined above. Assume
the economy of the North to be homogeneous (c2/ D > 2w /pB) and that of the
South to be dual (e2/ D < 2w /pB) . Suppose that at the initial equilibrium the
price of industrial goods and the rate of profit are relatively high in the North
(p1 > b 2 and 2r > aI / D). Labor is relatively abundant in the South (a large)
and capital relatively abundant in the North (ft large) . In this case an
increase in the transfer FT to the South has thefollowing consequences :
(i)
	
Oil supplies and oil exports increase in the South .
(ii) The North exports. and the South imports. fewer industrial goods.
However. the terms of trade move in favor of the North (pt increases)
so much that its export revenues rise . There is a corresponding fall
in oil export revenues of the South denominated to terms of its
import I .
(iii) Profits and real wages rise in the North, so much that its consump-tion of both goods increases.
(iv) /n the South. profits rise. but employment, real wages, and consump-
tion of basics all fall.
Proof. We consider first the market-clearing condition in the oil market :
XS = .0 (21)
From (6) . (9) . and (6)' . this equals :
-ii(FT) - di = 3§ (22)
From (14),
'3D = b jBS T b21S (23)
and from inverting ( :2) and (13) we obtain :
'OD = (c2L -a2K) + ~(a1K-c1L) (24)
In view of (3) and (4) . we may rewrite (22):
N
	
N N.OS(FT)
+ n Pe + D
_r Q	- E-
nN (P
where L and Q are the determinants defined above. Equation (25) gives an
implicit relation between real wages and the rates of profits in both regions .
and the transfer FT. which we denote as
9P [rN. r5. (ti /pB)N. (W Ipg)S . FT) = 0 (26)
Since factor prices are functions of commodity prices (see Appendix eqn A .7),
we obtain from substitution of (A .7) into (25) a function linking the transfer FT
to the prices of B and I :
M ~p ,
,6S(FT) + '
pa %c 2P - c 1PI + M) + D2(PlaI -Plat + Q) (27)
N N
+ (D~N)2PczP'-cA, r +
MN) + (DN )2 Q(P1aN®PBo2 + Q) = 0
Equation (27) is an implicit function of the form
OFT = - Or ,
OrOPI I OPd 87T1
8r __ 8,3S > 0
OFT OFT
r(FT .p1 , p8"P9) = 0
However, the prices of basics pB and PB (which may be different since basics
are not traded) are themselves functions of the price of industrial goods p1 in
equilibrium
From the Appendix eqn (A .13) we obtain :
PB = PB(PI) and PB = PRPI)
Therefore, eqn. (27) is actually an implicit function of pl and FT only
r(FT.pl) = r(FT.pl . pi(PI), Pff(PI)) = 0 (28)
It is then possible to differentiate implicitly across equilibria and obtain
8pl,8FT . or equivalently its reciprocal
This equat"lon represents the change in the price of industrial goods that fol-
lows an increase in the transfer FT . By (27) and (6) .
Therefore the sign of (29) is always that of -8r/, 8p1
(25)
(29)
We may now compute the derivative -8^/ 8pI .
	
From, (27) and (28) we
obtain
act w fla2r
N N,,Iv
-
_8P
-(DN)2
MmM
~1BV)2
N-cNPI)_
a
(DN)
~
	)
aNcN IV PN QNaN
(DN)2P# (DN)2
From expression (30) we may compute the changes in pl as FT changes . pro-
vided we know the signs of the derivatives Bpi/ 8p, and Opf/ 8pI across equili-
bria .
The next step is therefore to compute the signs of the derivatives of the
price of .basic goods with respect to the price of industrial goods across equili-
bria in each region . For this we utilize the expression relating the real wage
and the rate of profit in each region, derived from the market clearing condi-
tion Bs - RD = 0:
D PB D PB
- 13-
a ( !~)2 = 0 (31)
(see Appendix eqn. (A.11)). and also the equations relating factor prices to
commodity prices :
r
= PIaj _PBa2 y B
32
D ()
w _ PBc2_PICI + M
PB DPB
(see Appendix eqn (A 7)) . Equation (31) is an implicit expression between real
wages and profits in each region, denoted A(w /PB,r) = 0. Since eqns . (31) and
(32) give real wages and profits as functions of commodity prices . (31) actually
gives an implicit relation between commodity prices in each region . denoted
_ ~ iqj~ . 8(u~ lPB) _a'k . 8r ay . 8(u; / PB) 6-~ 8r
8(w/PB) 8pI + br 8pI l a(w/PB) . Spa	+ 8r &PB
(33)
*(PB " Pl) =AI- =0PB
-(pB.pj).r(PY .Pr)I (34)
From (34) . by the implicit function theorem . in each region-
OPB
_-OPI ( 8P ,/
(35)
where
A = a(c 2 / D -2w IPB)
®14°
From relation (40) we may now determine the sign of apB / aPl in both the
North and the South.
	
First note that ap B / apl is always positive in the North
since p t > b 2 , so that p1ci-M > 0, and G > 0 by assumption In the South
A < 0, but fl is rather small . Therefore, (40) is also positive in the South. With
this information we may now return to eqn (27) and compute pg % apl . As a is
large in the South and P is large in the North, we have from eqn . (30) that the
expression for -pg i apl is dominated by the following terms :
aM 8PB ac ~~! apE a2PNQX PNQNaN
D2P
(M -C'PI) 8P1 + DZPB + 8P1
(DN)2 (DN)z
- ~U-> 0
aPt
changes . From the national income identity
P11E = rK -FT
(41)
Here M-c1PI = c1 6 2 - Lice - CIPI is negative as c I is small in the South.
Hence the first term is positive (because MS < 0) and dominates the second,
which is multiplied by c i . As Q'?~ < 0, the third term is negative and the fourth
positive But a2 is small in the North. so that the fourth term dominates .
Hence we have that
This implies that the price of industrial goods pl rises as the transfer to the
South increases, i .e
OPI
aFT > 0
(42)
We next study the movements of the rate of return in the North r ^l as pl
Furthermore, from (32) and (33) we find that the partial derivatives
P(w APB) __
8P1 DPB
<0 (36)
ar = aj>0 (37)
apl D
8(W/")0 plc'- -~ > 0 when pl > 62 (36)
8PB Dpj
and
_
8PB D
0 (39)
Therefore we obtain from (35) and (39)
8PB c i a jPa2 (PIC -T )
a?
_
~
+
,
/ e + (40)
8P1 DPB D2 DPB DZ
As lff = lk-Xf and p,Xf = X' = Off.
Plik = rX + Og-FT
In the North. P is large . We can therefore neglect terms other than those in ~e
giving
P/ = [(-Q /D) + r, l (ai/D)
	
_ .
with
15-
'OP! =D/a, > 0 (43)
Hence as FT rises, p, rises and the profit rate-in the North rN rises . Knowing
how rN moves enables us to find the sign of the change in the real wage in the
North. We can rewrite the market-clearing condition for the B market . eqn .
(7), as
aczw Pa2r_ _tu
DPB D
a (p8I'= 0
(see Appendix eqn . (A .11)) . Implicit differentiation gives :
8(w / pB) - azB
8r - D 6
(44)
where t3 = a(c2/ D -2w lpB) . As A < 0 in the North by assumption. we have
that
d(W /PB )
in the North Hence an increase in FT raises the real wage in the North, as well
as the profit rate . The next step is to show that the consumption levels of B
and I rise in the North.
Ip - rK-FT = Pre-FT
8Iff -
2dr 8r
N
-1
8FT 8FT
which is positive for large P Also,
B1~= wL /pB = a(w / pB)2	(47)
so that B,1qV also rises with FT by (45) . (42) . and (43) We have now proven point
(iii) of Theorem 1 .
Next we study the response of trade patterns to FT We have, by inverting
(12) and (13) .
X~= IS - Ip =
a
D
K
-
c
~L rK + FT
From '3) and (4)
_ CL I c 1 w
XN _
r
DPB
_ -prZ
+
FT
(46)
Hence
8Xr
_P(!~L-2r)-cl
8(w I PB) + 8FT apt
8r
	
D D 8r apt 8r
By the conditions of the theorem, the first term is negative. By (45) the second
term is negative. and by (44) it contains P. As Q is large, these terms dominate,
and
ax,N
<0
8r
i .e the North's exports of the industrial good fall as FT and hence rN rise .
This implies, of course . that the South's imports of industrial goods fall,
a MS
Sr N
<0
Here y4 is large and Q is negative, by assumption r rises, by (43) Hence
813Y _ aX,so
-WT 8FT > 0
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We next check what hapens to the volume of oil traded . This equals oil
demanded to the North, 131, which from Appendix eqn (A.3) is
- awm _ PrQ
DPB D
This proves points (i) and (ii) of Theorem 1 .
What remains is to study the behavior of the Southern economy . We first
show that rs rises with FT . This is done by showing that BMf / 8r s < 0 . As
8Mj _ 8mj OrN
8r s
_
Or N Or s
this will imply from (49) that 8r N / Brs > 0, which in conjunction with (42) and
(43) gives the desired result .
Mh -- !~ -13F
= rK + ,6s + FT -Is
v Pray claw
=pr Z - + + -6S + FT
D DPB
aMS 8(w /P B) 8,3s 8FT LM-Is
Ors -
~(2r -a~/ D) + (c l a/ D) ( 8r ) + ( eMjs + 8ddjs ) 8rs
81dj
( 1-
8Js - 8FT ) = P(2r _ a l / D) + c ~a/ 17 (
a (w
8
PB) )
8rs amj ams
Now
"s _ a$s Or N
I
<0
8M 8r N 8M!
(49)
(50)
by (49). (42). (43), and (S) . Similarly . OFT / 8Al< < 0 . By (44), O(w / PB)/ Or < 0
in the South. As by assumption as is large. this establishes that
Drs
< 0 so that
	
8F
Ors
T > 0
(51)
It now follows from (44) and the tact that AS < 0 by assumption, that real wages
in the South fall with FT. It follows immediately from (3) and (5) that employ-
ment and the consumption of basics also fall .
This completes the proof of Theorem 1 .
Theorem 2. Suppose MS > 0, i.e . c lbz-b lc2 > 0 in the South. Let pg be
small and Pt > b? at the initial equilibrium, with all other conditions as in
Theorem 1 . Then an increase in the financial transfer to the South has the
opposite effects to those established in Theorem 1 : it leads to a fall in pt, the
price of the industrial good, and a relative increase in the price of oil. even
though oil supplies have increased. The oil exporter's terms of trade therefore
improve. In addition., oil exports and the rate of profit in the South decrease .
The North exports more industrial goods . Real wages, employment, and con-
sumption of basics increase in the South. In the North, the rate of profit and
the real wage decrease.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 1 . the sign of aFT / ap t equals that of
ar / Opt. This is given in eqn. (30). or approximately in (41). The latter may
also be written as
am aPB
(R -c1Pt)1+c~ + PQ
apg ,a 2 -a N
~Pa apt PB (D
M)2 aPt
Now note from (40) that for large PN.
Op B _ _a i
Opt a2
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Hence the second term above is zero and (41) can be expressed as
OPB 1 OPB b I am
~c~ (b2 Pt)
8pt PO + 1 OPt PB
2
D?pg
(41)
Under the conditions of Theorem 2. this is negative, proving that the oil
exporter's terms of trade improve. i.e . Pt falls with FT.
The rest of the theorem follows immediately . Inequality (43) implies that
the profit rate in the North falls . and (44) implies that real wages in the North
fall . Inequality (48) tells us that the North's exports (and the South's imports)
of industrial goods will increase, and from (50) we then know that oil exports of
the South fall (52) establishes that the rate of profit in the South falls, and
using (44) again proves that real wages, employment, and consumption of basic
goods rise in the South This completes the proof .
The main difference in the conditions of Theorems I and 2. which reverse
the results, are first, the sign of Ms and second. the impact that the transfer
has on the relative price of industrial goods. The sign of XS is positive in
Theorem 2, and negative in Theorem 1 . It seems more plausible that YS
should be negative, since this happens when the basic goods sector in the
South uses few capital inputs . Theorem 2 assumes, instead, that the basic
goods sector is more capital intensive . The impact of the transfer on prices
seems also more plausible in Theorem 1 . There, the transfer increases oil sup-
plies, and this leads to lower oil prices. In Theorem 2. the transfer also
increases oil supplies, but this leads to higher oil prices. Clearly, an empirical
analysis of the actual conditions is needed to evaluate the results, but. a priors,
the conditions in Theorem 1 appear more intuitively natural than those in
Theorem 2.
A final point is the stability of the equllibria under the standard Walrasian
adjustment process in which prices increase with excess demand, and decrease
with excess supply . This is a rather specialized issue since the model has con
stant returns to scale . The Walrasian stability of a closely related model (Chi-
chilnisky 1981b) has been studied in Heal and McLeod (1983) and the
interested reader is referred to that paper for a detailed analysis .
4 . CONCLUSIONS
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We have considered a situation where an inflow of capital investment into a
country's oil sector has allowed that country to run a deficit on its balance of
trade
	
The capital inflow is, of course . matched by an accumulation of indebt
edness to foreigners . An inflow of foreign capital . whether used for consump-
tion or for investment, inevitably affects the internal equilibrium of the receiv-
ing country . Consumption patterns, production patterns, and prices all
change . The same is true of the lending country it changes its consumption
pattern by making a loan . and for this reason, and because the equilibrium of
its trading partner changes, its own domestic equilibrium alters . A crucial fac-
tor in determuxing these macro effects of a loan is the change in relative prices
(oil prices, industrial prices, and prices of basic goods that are not traded) . A
loan must be of a significant size before having a measurable impact on prices,
and the cases we discussed here, where the loan is of the order of 100 billion
US dollars, certainly fit this description.
It is clear, then . that it is a complex matter to trace the full impacts of a
loan from one trading country to another. Our model has enabled us to iden-
tify these impacts in a rather simple fashion, because of our somewhat stylized
assumptions, and to assess the gains and the losses arising from such a loan for
different groups within the lending and borrowing countries . One important
feature to emerge is that the loan may have a beneficial effect on the equili-
brium of the lending country. This happens when the borrowed funds are used
to increase oil supplies, leading to more abundant oil . increased oil exports,
and lower oil prices . The terms of trade of the lending country improve, and
this leadsto higher levels of consumption of both goods in the lending country .
Theorem 1 establishes the conditions under which the welfare level in the lend-
ing country will rise as a result . In making a social cost-benefit analysis of
such a loan, this is a point that should clearly be considered: there is a social
return to the loan over and above the rate of interest paid on it . It is possible
that even if a major rescheduling that delayed repayment were to happen, the
lending country as a whole could nevertheless benefit . Private financial institu-
tions making the loan might of course be strained in such a situation . There
could then be an argument in favor of the government compensating banks in
the case of temporary losses . in view of the positive externalities that their
actions have generated for the rest of the economy . Obviously, such a policy
would require very careful analysis of the macro effects and of the interna-
tional markets concerned.
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Similar issues apply to the receiving country . The borrowing sector may
benefit in commercial terms from the loan, but a social cost-benefit analysis of
the loan should also take into account its effects on the overall economic
equilibrium . As Theorem 1 shows, these could be substantially negative . if
there has been overspecialization in one sector thus leading to lower terms of
trade for the country, with correspondingly negative welfare effects . In sum-
mary, the fact that a loan, if large, may affect the equilibrium pattern of prices
and quantities in both countries means that it will have macroeconomic conse-
quences going tar beyond its impacts on the profits of the borrowing and lead-
ing institutions .
Theorems 1 and 2 have indicated two very different possible outcomes. In
one case, the effects are beneficial to the lending and harmful to the borrowing
country, while in the other case the opposite is true . The disUnguishuig
feature is the effect of the loan on the oil exporter's terms of trade. In the
first case, they worsen, and in the second, they improve . Which of these two
outcomes occurs depends on the patterns of factor intensities in the receiving
country and the initial price levels . Once these are known, thus establishing
whether the loan improves or worsens the receiver's terms of trade, everything
else can be traced . Experience indicates that over the last three years, the
terms of trade of oil exporters have worsened. While many factors have contri-
buted to this price movement, this suggests that a policy of borrowing to invest
in the oil sector might not have been the most favorable to the oil exporter .
However, such a policy could be favorable to the lender ; it yields more oil at
lower prices . Such macro outcomes should be computed when discussing the
present situation . The calculus of the debt must go beyond the financial
aspects, and must include the macroeconomic effects on prices, imports, and
exports of both countries .
It is important to emphasize that we have studied the consequences of
granting a loan before thus was repaid The repayments will not have effects
that are simply equal and opposite to those of the granting of the loan . The
asymmetry arises because . when the loan is made, it is invested or consumed
in sectors different than those that will pay the debt . For instance, in this
paper the debt was used to build up the production capacity of the oil sector
However, when the loan is repaid, this will not of course coincide with running
down this capacity . Investment is irreversible, and capital stock and machines
depreciate . The loan will be repaid by running a balance-of-trade surplus . The
effects of running a trade surplus at a constant capacity level in the oil sector
are not the opposite of those running a trade deficit and using the capital
inflow to expand oil-producing capacity . As a matter of fact, both could affect
the major macro variables in the same direction . This distinction between
receiving and repaying a loan will be developed further in a subsequent paper .
Finally . we point out a connection between the problem that we have stu-
died here and the extensive literature on the transfer problem in international
economics. This literature is concerned with the possibility that a transfer of
resources from one agent, or country to another may benefit the donor and
harm the recipient . This issue has so far been studied only in the context of a
barter economy without production in the case of perfectly competitive gen-
eral equilibrium models For surveys of these results, see Chuchilnisky (1980) .
Jones (1983) . and Geanakoplos and Heal (1983) . Our present Theorem I pro-
vides an example of the transfer paradox in a production economy resources
are transferred from lender to borrower, and the lender gains as a result
(Theorem 1) . even though the receiver expands its production capacity .
APPENDIX 1 : Analytic Solutions
This appendix gives an explicit analytic solution to the model. and
presents the results of numerical simulations on the effects of rescheduling
the debt reported in the paper.
In order to solve the model we consider first
exported with oll imported:
XS - Me
In view of (6) . (9) . and (6)' . this equals
i3s(FT) - 'OD = '3D
where the left-hand-side variables are from the South From (14). (12),
where
'dD = D
-'(cLL -a2K) + ~a1K-cIL)
D PS
	
D
M =cjb2-b1C2 Q= a2bI-alb2
Therefore, we may rewrite (A.2) as
,3S(FT) -
a '-M - Er Q = °`
N ( w )NMN - n'rNQn'
D PB D DN PB D N
(A.4) is therefore an implicit equation in five variables, which we denote
Our next step is to write the rate of profit r and the wage w lpB in the two
regions as functions of the prices of basic and industrial goods . PH and p, .
Recall that oil is the numeraire (p d = 1) . From the production functions (1)
and (2) we obtain the associated competitive price equations
pa = a l'c' + b ipe + c'r
PI = a2w +b2Pe + c2r
(pB-b2I = ~a2 ~2
20
the equation equating oil
since p,6 = 1 . We therefore obtain the factor-commodity price relations :
(A.2)
and (13)
(A.3)
(A 4)
(A .s)
(A . 6)
__ c2PB_CIPl
+M
"' D
_!!L_ __ (PB
_
b 1)c2 + (b 2 -P!)c I
PB
	
DPB
__ (bI -PB)a2+ CLIV"I - b2) __ CLIP/
_ CL2PB + Q
r D D
Substituting w / pB and r from (A.7) into (A5), we obtain a new Implicit func-
tion . in four rather than five variables :
Recall that pa may be different from pB because B is not traded internation-
ally . The last step is to substitute pB and pB as functions of pl into (A.B) . This
will lead to an implicit function in two variables
Since FT is an exogenously given parameter, (A.9) is an analytic solution to the
model. from (A.9) we may compute the equilibrium level of industrial prices
pj(FT) . 1t is easy to check that once pJ is known, we may solve for the equili-
brium values of all other endogenous variables . This will be explained below
Now, in order to obtain pB =PB(p/), we use another market-clearing con-
dition . this time in the B-market:
or
*(FT. pl . PB. PB) = 0 (AB)
X(FT . Pl) = 0 (A9)
BS = BD
From (12) and (13) this can be written as
c2L - a2K
L=
D PB
a ct w _Pazr-a(- 2=0
D PB D PB
from which we obtain
W c2 c 2 Pa 2r 2
FY
_
B D_14D2_ Da ) _
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(A.7)
(A.10)
(A.12)
a two-branched function relating w / PB* and r The different parameter values
will determine which is the appropriate branch in (A .12) .
Usmg again the factor-commodity price relations, (A.12) yields an implicit
relation betweenpB and p/, as desired :
1
c2 _ _1 c 22 Pa2
(Q + IPl)
2 _ M
c2 + c 1P/ c 0
aDPB t PB 4D2	D 2a a
2pB
DPB D DPB
(A.13)
Substituting (A.13) into (A.8) . we obtain the desired relation (A.9) between FT
and pt
y(FT. pt) = 0
From (A.9) we may then compute p! =pj(FT) . From (A.13) we obtain ps(N)
and p;(S). and from these three equilibrium prices we obtain the equilibrium
rates of profit r"(N) and r "(S) . and of real wages. (w / pB) "(N) and
(w/pB) "(S) . From these we obtain supply of labor and capital in the North
and the South. and using the inversion of (12) and (13) we obtain the output of
B and 1 in both regions . From the national income identity we may compute
demand for 1 in the South, which determines imports from the North. and from
(40), exports of oil from the South . From (14) we obtain oil demanded in the
South, thus completing the computation of the equilibrium .
2a . Listing of Equations of the Model :System of simultaneous
equations solved by TK-solver software package
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APPENDIX 2 :
A Simulation for Mexico and the U .S .A .
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A . Listing of Equations of the Model : System of simultaneous
equations solved by
	
TK-solver software package
F\nanicial Transfers
"Misc . Determi
" U .S .-Mexico Model with
* D=a1*c2-c1*a2
* Ds=a1s*c2s-c1s*a2s
* M=c1*b2-c2*b1
* Ms=c1s*b2s-c2s*b1s
* Q=a2*b1-a1*b2
* Qs=a2s*b1s-a1s*b2s
* w=(M+c2*PB-c1*Pl)/D
* ws=(Ms+c2s*PBs-c1s*Pl)/Ds
* r=(a1*PI-a2*PB+Q)/D
* rs=(a1s*PI-a2s*PBs+Qs)/Ds
* K=b*r+SK
* Ks=bs*rs+SKs
* L=a*(w/PB)+SL
* Ls=as*(ws/PBs)+SLs
* BS=(c2*L-a2*K)/D
* BSs=(c2s*Ls-a2s*Ks)/Ds
* lS=(a1*K-c1*L)/D
* ISs=(a1s*Ks-c1s*Ls)/Ds
* NT=Fn-Fs
* OSs=(NT*sh)*k+SOS
* OS+OX=b1*BS+b2*IS
* Bd=(w*L)/PB
* Bds=(ws*Ls)/PBs
* BS=Bd
* BSs=Bds
* lds=lSs+Xl
* Id=IS-XI
* L=LD
* K=KD
* Ks=KDs
* Ls=LDs
* Pl*Xl=PO*OX
* TOS=OS+OSs
* TOD=b1*BS+b2*IS+b1s*8Ss+b2s*lSs
* TOS=TOD
* TIS=IS+lSs
* lId=ld+lds
* wexp=PO*OX-Pl*XI
* PBs*BSs+Pl*(lSs+Xl)=ws*Ls+rs*Ks+PO*OSs
* PB*BS+PI*(I8-XI)=W'*L+r*K+PO*OS
* Sdual=c2s/Ds-2*ws/PBs
* Ndual=c2/D-2*w/PB
* NGNP=PB*BS+Pl*lS
* SGNP=PBs*BSs+PI*lSs
* PP=1/Pl
"Capital Supply
"Labor Supply Equations
"Net Financial Transfer
"Oil supply depends on NT and k (capital output
"oil supply = demand" Basic Good, S=D
" Basic Good, S=D
" Industrial Good, S=D
"Equilibrium Conditions
"Balance of Trade
nants
"Walras , Law
"Duality Indicies
2b , Exogenous Parameters and Endogenous solutions
St Input
,5 .55
Name
SOS
Output
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Unit Comment
U .S . Mexico Test Data 1:4-84?
Mex oil supply intercept
L 53 .7875 Fn $80 Financial flows from the U .S .
5 Fs Financial flows from Mexico
1 .1 86 k Petroleum capital output ratio
1 =_.h Share of capital inflow invested in pe
9 .0484549 MBD U .S . oft supply
1142 .4624 'LK U .S . Capital Intercept
106 .32042 SL U .S . Labor Intercept
8 .052052 a U .S . Alpha
3783 .0258 b U .S . Beta
13 .388079 as Mex Alpha
955 .61479 bs Mex Beta
11 .54 SLs Mex Labor Intercept
246 .7{281 SKs Mex Capital Intercept
.08179253 a1 U .S . labor input
.06475242 a2 U .S . labor input
.0649''331 bl U .S . Oil input
.02782428 b2 U .S . . Oil input
.74613511 ci U .S . Capital Input
1 .3952113 c2 U .S . Capital Input
.32017112 als Mex Labor input
.15762271 a2s Me>. labor input
.1899686 b1 s Mex OIL input
.06449843 b2s Mex OIL input
1 .2904133 c1s Mex Capital input
3 .5938466 c2s Mex Capital Input
L Id 626 .23747 Capital Goods Demand in the U .S .
L PB 1 .1730468 Price of basics in the U .S .
L PBs 2 .0886154 Price of basics in Mexico
L PI 1 .1261535 World Price of Capital Good=_.
32 PO $80 Price of petroleum
L PP 28 .415310 $80 Terms of trade
L OSs 3 .7457175 MBD Mexico's Oil Production
L Ox 2 .0213063 MBD Oil Exports
L 20 .964166 Capital Goods Exports
L ws 5 .9885036 Mex wage rate
L rs .03275902 Mex Profit Rate
L K 2181 .9551 U .S . Capital Good=_. Supply
L L 182 .11085 U .S . labor supply
L r .27477811 U .S . Profit Rate
L w 11 .041374 U .S . wage rate
L BS 1714 .1293 U .S . supply of Basics
L Bss 143 .14976 Mex Basic Good Supply
L is 647 .20163 U .S . Capital Goods Supply
L Iss 25 .973689 Mex Capital Goods Supply
L Ls 49 .926463 Mex Labor Supply
L k:s v 278 .06781 Mex capital stock
Bd 1714 .1293 U .S . Basic Goods Demand
Bds 143 .14976 Mex Basic Goods Demand
Ids 46 .937855 Mex Capital Goods Demand
LD 182 .11085 U .S . Labor Demand
LDs 49 .92646'3 Mex Labor demand
KD 21 ;31 .9551 U .S . Capital Demand
KDs 278 .06781 Mex Capital demand
NT 43 .03 $80 Net financial transfers
M - .0698211
Ms - .3803653
D .06580381
Ds .94724745
a .00192812
Os -3 .177E-4
2c' . Background Data
$40.00
$35.00 -i
$30-00
W$25.00 -
$10-00-
$5-00 -!
$0.00
70
"VIIEXICAN AIL EXPORT PRICE
SOURCE: WHARTON ECONOMETRICS
~2 74 7e 78 so 82 84
YEAR
ONET CAPITAL INFLOW AND PEMEX INVE TME
SOURCE: WHARTON ECONOMETRICS
B
5
4
3
0
71 73 75 77 79 81 83
YEAR
0
	
NET CAPITAL INFLOW + PEMEX INVESTMENT
MEXICO OIL PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS
3.5
2-5-
0.5 -~
SOURCE: WHARTON ECONOMETRICS
0
70 72 74 7E 78 80 82 84
YEAR
0 OIL EXPORTS 4 OIL PRODUCTION
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2d . Results of Simulations
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i'w :aOS9 :bi > b2') Northern Variables
i= n pp FS Pes P I I ci Ws
32 .2725 34 .0888178 .914516841 .7" 14766882 .938724252 820 .064008 1 .03146752
3:3 . ;.14825 33 .75740 70 .927438634 .733417546 .947940108 E: i 4 .1 : .5785 i .08'167339
34 .424 33 .4331172 .940307566 .7541 37708 .957134801 80i.68899 l .15575974
35 .49'975 33 .1186351 .953005310 .77745736i .966223394 790 .259246 i . G.3 i 85307
36 .5755 32 .81 78878 .965354568 .804166411 .975077988 779 .144550 1 .321i2451
'37 . 65125 32 . 537003.2 .97707470i . 8;:55330 i i . 93'3495524 768 .838783 1 .42863204
:38 .727 :32 .2865524 .987680855 .873825090 .99112471i4 759/ . 7 i O987 1 .56354870
39 .80275 :32 .0 878052 . .996200128 .923862717 . 5'97260 T98 752 .5i2537 1 .74503187
40 .8785 31 .999'1827 1 .00000077 .999'115617 1 .00000054 749 .3387'14 2 .02384347
41 .5.5425 32 .3708998 .98405'23;34 1 .20495038 .988542i8c. 762 .7785i4 2 .82335258
4;3 .03 32 .5135153 .5'78063190 1 .42562704 .984206090 767 .980182 3 .66650443
44 .10575 32 .2540031 .989070197 1 .53002495 .992124914 758 .5259014 4 .05407772
45 .1815 31 .9148182 1 .0037007 1 .61056996 1 .00266904 746 .271 1 '16 4 .64302423
46 .25725 31 .5,377292 1 .0203005c/ 1 .67965860 1 .01465771 7 ;.12 .771003 4 .53331 :390
47 .333 31 .1362644 1 .03837379 1 .74292248 1 .02774050 718 .546613 4 .81101399
48 .40875 ;30 .7164441 1 .05773147 1 .80281566 1 .04178726 703 . 8:37644 5 .01911250
49 .4845 30 .2814013 1 .07830509 1 .86076714 1 .05675427 688 .774243 5 .218590 57
50 .56025 29 .83291 24 1 .10008564 1 .91771559 1 .07264033 673 .436826 5 .41301048
51 .636 29 .3720246 1 .12309931 1 .97433732 1 .08947191 657 .8713418 5 .60490413
52 .7 1175 23 . 8'"193751 1 1 .147399651 2 .03115332 1 .10729038 1,42 . i 36200 5 .79620309
5 ;3 .7875 28 .4153098 1 .17304680 2 .081301544 1 .1261534'3 626 .237469 5 .98850301
NSMOS10 List of Variables
rs r w OX OSs Sdu a 1 SGHP
.193017110 .296207419 7 .03508732 1 .07975067 2 .15325243. .9078243.82 130 .702837
.198028599 .294947169 7 .45450074 1 .135`77608 2 .23287571 .822493933 1 :3 ;3 . :358107
.197688538 .29'3712032 4 .02 :316481 1 .19786324 2 .31249896 .728873305 136 . 1'18653
.196440119 .2925146013 8 .1493 ;3631 1 .25:361800 2 .39212222 .6250 615:38 139 .263552
. 1 ?54285799 .291368766 4 . :.=:5077224 1 .30640784 2 .47174547 .508289901 142 .636193
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